Describe some of the trade-offs that are encountered in product and service design

Recommended textbook solutions

Tonal Harmony, Workbook

8th EditionByron Almen, Dorothy Payne, Stefan Kostka

1,387 solutions

America's History for the AP Course

8th EditionEric Hinderaker, James A. Henretta, Rebecca Edwards, Robert O. Self

470 solutions

Ways of the World: A Global History

3rd EditionRobert W. Strayer

232 solutions

Tonal Harmony

8th EditionByron Almen, Dorothy Payne, Stefan Kostka

136 solutions

You can’t put every single feature into a design. It is simply impossible. The design would be to big, too expensive, and useless. So one must decide which features to add to the design to maximize its usability and marketability, while also considering maximizing profit. Some parts of the design cost too much and may not give as much return as less expensive designs could and vice versa. “This is a typical design-to-budget situation. Tradeoffs on the delivered service items must be made to comply with the cost constraint” (reference 2)

When considering adding features to things such as smartphones you must think of how much profit you would earn or how many more phones you would sell because of the new feature and if the cost of adding the new feature would be worth it. “This development is crucial, since the preliminary decision making process of any design cycle has the greatest effect on overall cost.” The overall design needs to focus on certain aspects and be tailored to specific functions through the various designs. The people it can be tailored to or how many people it can accommodate  depends on the different aspects of the design so If one aspect is changed the opportunity cost is that the people that may have bought the product for the previous design are now lost. Analyzing trade offs between the changes and different designs can maximize profit by weighing which aspects of the design are most important to the final goal.

There are other trade offs in the design process then costs though. Altering aspects of the product also change other parts of the overall design, such as when implementing safety features in a car as mentioned in reference 3. They define their trade off in the situation as “The consequences that result when a decision is made given the current state of the environment,” They mention that if they let the car have more automated technology then the driver may feel a greater effect, such as losing the ability to control the car himself in certain situations and how safe he feels when the car is essentially guiding itself. When implementing new technologies that require less and less human navigation you must consider the consequences that people face. They lose the feeling of having control and freedom over what they own and how the product is performing, which may make them feel uncomfortable, but at the same time they want a product that is smart that requires them to do little work. So a happy medium must be found that can satisfy the majority of people while keeping them safe.

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=tradeoffs+in+design&source=web&cd=5&ved=0CEQQFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fciteseerx.ist.psu.edu%2Fviewdoc%2Fdownload%3Fdoi%3D10.1.1.7.6703%26rep%3Drep1%26type%3Dpdf&ei=NixrUOWaGaHr0gH-3IHIAg&usg=AFQjCNG8Oqgc8lj7dBHcjuYJiE6untytcg reference 1

http://www.spaceops2012.org/proceedings/documents/id1275286-Paper-002.pdf (reference 2)

http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=00869020 reference 3

Chapter 4. Design Tradeoffs

with Brian Gustafson, Paul Blankinship, and Felix Gröbert

So you’re going to build a (software) product! You’ll have lots of things to think about in this complex journey from devising high-level plans to deploying code.

Typically, you’ll start out with a rough idea of what the product or service is going to do. This might, for example, take the form of a high-level concept for a game, or a set of high-level business requirements for a cloud-based productivity application. You’ll also develop high-level plans for how the service offering will be funded.

As you delve into the design process and your ideas about the shape of the product become more specific, additional requirements and constraints on the design and implementation of the application tend to emerge. There’ll be specific requirements for the functionality of the product, and general constraints, such as development and operational costs. You’ll also come upon requirements and constraints for security and reliability: your service will likely have certain availability and reliability requirements, and you might have security requirements for protecting sensitive user data handled by your application.

Some of these requirements and constraints may be in conflict with each other, and you’ll need to make tradeoffs and find the right balance between them.

Design Objectives and Requirements

The feature requirements for your product will tend to have significantly different characteristics than your requirements for security and reliability. Let’s take a closer look at the types of requirements you’ll face when designing a product.

Feature Requirements

Feature requirements, also known as functional requirements,1 identify the primary function of a service or application and describe how a user can accomplish a particular task or satisfy a particular need. They are often expressed in terms of use cases, user stories, or user journeys—sequences of interactions between a user and the service or application. Critical requirements are the subset of feature requirements that are essential to the product or service. If a design does not satisfy a critical requirement or critical user story, you don’t have a viable product.

Feature requirements are typically the primary drivers for your design decisions. After all, you’re trying to build a system or service that satisfies a particular set of needs for the group of users you have in mind. You often have to make tradeoff decisions between the various requirements. With that in mind, it is useful to distinguish critical requirements from other feature requirements.

Usually, a number of requirements apply to the entire application or service. These requirements often don’t show up in user stories or individual feature requirements. Instead, they’re stated once in centralized requirements documentation, or even implicitly assumed. Here’s an example:

• Follow common visual design guidelines
• Adhere to accessibility guidelines
• Have a footer with links to privacy policy and ToS (Terms of Service)

Nonfunctional Requirements

Several categories of requirements focus on general attributes or behaviors of the system, rather than specific behaviors. These nonfunctional requirements are relevant to our focus—security and reliability. For example:

• What are the exclusive circumstances under which someone (an external user, customer-support agent, or operations engineer) may have access to certain data?

• What are the service level objectives (SLOs) for metrics such as uptime or 95th-percentile and 99th-percentile response latency? How does the system respond under load above a certain threshold?

When balancing requirements, it can be helpful to simultaneously consider requirements in areas beyond the system itself, since choices in those areas can have significant impact on core system requirements. Those broader areas include the following:

Features Versus Emergent Properties

Feature requirements usually exhibit a fairly straightforward connection between the requirements, the code that satisfies those requirements, and tests that validate the implementation. For example:

A web or mobile application based on this specification would typically have code that very specifically relates to that requirement, such as the following:

• Structured types to represent the profile data

• UI code to present and permit modification of the profile data

• Server-side RPC or HTTP action handlers to query the signed-in user’s profile data from a data store, and to accept updated information to be written to the data store

In contrast, nonfunctional requirements—like reliability and security requirements—are often much more difficult to pin down. It would be nice if your web server had an --enable_high_reliability_mode flag, and to make your application reliable you’d simply need to flip that flag and pay your hosting or cloud provider a premium service fee. But there is no such flag, and no specific module or component in any application’s source code that “implements” reliability.

Example: Google Design Document

Google uses a design document template to guide new feature design and to collect feedback from stakeholders before starting an engineering project.

The template sections pertaining to reliability and security considerations remind teams to think about the implications of their project and kick off the production readiness or security review processes if appropriate. Design reviews sometimes happen multiple quarters before engineers officially start thinking about the launch stage.

Balancing Requirements

Because the attributes of a system that satisfy security and reliability concerns are largely emergent properties, they tend to interact both with implementations of feature requirements and with each other. As a result, it’s particularly difficult to reason about tradeoffs involving security and reliability as a standalone topic.

This section presents an example that illustrates the kinds of tradeoffs you might have to consider. Some parts of this example delve quite deeply into technical details, which aren’t necessarily important in and of themselves. All of the compliance, regulatory, legal, and business considerations that go into designing payment processing systems and their operation aren’t important for this example either. Instead, the purpose is to illustrate the complex interdependencies between requirements. In other words, the focus isn’t on the nitty-gritty details about protecting credit card numbers, but rather the thought process that goes into designing a system with complex security and reliability requirements.

Example: Payment Processing

Imagine that you’re building an online service that sells widgets to consumers.2 The service’s specification includes a user story stipulating that a user can pick widgets from an online catalog by using a mobile or web application. The user can then purchase the chosen widgets, which requires that they provide details for a payment method.

Security and reliability considerations

Accepting payment information introduces significant security and reliability considerations for the system’s design and organizational processes. Names, addresses, and credit card numbers are sensitive personal data that require special safeguards3 and can subject your system to regulatory standards, depending on the applicable jurisdiction. Accepting payment information may also bring the service in scope for compliance with industry-level or regulatory security standards such as PCI DSS.

A compromise of this sensitive user information, especially personally identifiable information (PII), can have serious consequences for the project and even the entire organization/company. You might lose the trust of your users and customers, and lose their business as a result. In recent years, legislatures have enacted laws and regulations placing potentially time-consuming and expensive obligations on companies affected by data breaches. Some companies have even gone entirely out of business because of a severe security incident, as noted in Chapter 1.

In certain scenarios, a higher-level tradeoff at the product design level might free the application from processing payments—for example, perhaps the product can be recast in an advertising-based or community-funded model. For the purposes of our example, we’ll stick with the premise that accepting payments is a critical requirement.

Using a third-party service provider to handle sensitive data

Often, the best way to mitigate security concerns about sensitive data is to not hold that data in the first place (for more on this topic, see Chapter 5). You may be able to arrange for sensitive data to never pass through your systems, or at least design the systems to not persistently store the data.4 You can choose from various commercial payment service APIs to integrate with the application, and offload handling of payment information, payment transactions, and related concerns (such as fraud countermeasures) to the vendor.

Benefits

Depending on the circumstances, using a payment service may reduce risk and the degree to which you need to build in-house expertise to address risks in this area, instead relying on the provider’s expertise:

• Your systems no longer hold the sensitive data, reducing the risk that a vulnerability in your systems or processes could result in a data compromise. Of course, a compromise of the third-party vendor could still compromise your users’ data.

• Depending on the specific circumstances and applicable requirements, your contractual and compliance obligations under payment industry security standards may be simplified.

• You don’t have to build and maintain infrastructure to protect the data at rest in your system’s data stores. This could eliminate a significant amount of development and ongoing operational effort.

• Many third-party payment providers offer countermeasures against fraudulent transactions and payment risk assessment services. You may be able to use these features to reduce your payment fraud risk, without having to build and maintain the underlying infrastructure yourself.

On the flip side, relying on a third-party service provider introduces costs and risks of its own.

Costs and nontechnical risks

Obviously, the provider will charge fees. Transaction volume will likely inform your choice here—beyond a certain volume, it’s probably more cost-effective to process transactions in-house.

You also need to consider the engineering cost of relying on a third-party dependency: your team will have to learn how to use the vendor’s API, and you might have to track changes/releases of the API on the vendor’s schedule.

Reliability risks

By outsourcing payment processing, you add an additional dependency to your application—in this case, a third-party service. Additional dependencies often introduce additional failure modes. In the case of third-party dependencies, these failure modes may be partially out of your control. For example, your user story “user can buy their chosen widgets” may fail if the payment provider’s service is down or unreachable via the network. The significance of this risk depends on the payment provider’s adherence to the SLAs that you have with that provider.

You might address this risk by introducing redundancy into the system (see Chapter 8)—in this case, by adding an alternate payment provider to which your service can fail over. This redundancy introduces cost and complexity—the two payment providers most likely have different APIs, so you must design your system to be able to talk to both, along with all the additional engineering and operational costs, plus increased exposure to bugs or security compromises.

You could also mitigate the reliability risk through fallback mechanisms on your side. For example, you might insert a queueing mechanism into the communication channel with the payment provider to buffer transaction data if the payment service is unreachable. Doing so would allow the “purchase flow” user story to proceed during a payment service outage.

However, adding the message queueing mechanism introduces extra complexity and may introduce its own failure modes. If the message queue is not designed to be reliable (for example, it stores data in volatile memory only), you can lose transactions—a new risk surface. More generally, subsystems that are exercised only in rare and exceptional circumstances can harbor hidden bugs and reliability issues.

You could choose to use a more reliable message queue implementation. This likely involves either an in-memory storage system that is distributed across multiple physical locations, again introducing complexity, or storage on persistent disk. Storing the data on disk, even if only in exceptional scenarios, reintroduces the concerns about storing sensitive data (risk of compromise, compliance considerations, etc.) that you were trying to avoid in the first place. In particular, some payment data is never even allowed to hit disk, which makes a retry queue that relies on persistent storage difficult to apply in this scenario.

In this light, you may have to consider attacks (in particular, attacks by insiders) that purposely break the link with the payment provider in order to activate local queueing of transaction data, which may then be compromised.

In summary, you end up encountering a security risk that arose from your attempt to mitigate a reliability risk, which in turn arose because you were trying to mitigate a security risk!

Security risks

The design choice to rely on a third-party service also raises immediate security considerations.

First, you’re entrusting sensitive customer data to a third-party vendor. You’ll want to choose a vendor whose security stance is at least equal to your own, and will have to carefully evaluate vendors during selection and on an ongoing basis. This is not an easy task, and there are complex contractual, regulatory, and liability considerations that are outside the scope of this book and which should be referred to your counsel.

Second, integrating with the vendor’s service may require you to link a vendor-supplied library into your application. This introduces the risk that a vulnerability in that library, or one of its transitive dependencies, may result in a vulnerability in your systems. You may consider mitigating this risk by sandboxing the library5 and by being prepared to quickly deploy updated versions of it (see Chapter 7). You can largely avoid this concern by using a vendor that does not require you to link a proprietary library into your service (see Chapter 6). Proprietary libraries can be avoided if the vendor exposes its API using an open protocol like REST+JSON, XML, SOAP, or gRPC.

You may need to include a JavaScript library in your web application client in order to integrate with the vendor. Doing so allows you to avoid passing payment data through your systems, even temporarily—instead, payment data can be sent from a user’s browser directly to the provider’s web service. However, this integration raises similar concerns as including a server-side library: the vendor’s library code runs with full privileges in the web origin of your application.6 A vulnerability in that code or a compromise of the server that’s serving that library can lead to your application being compromised. You might consider mitigating that risk by sandboxing payment-related functionality in a separate web origin or sandboxed iframe. However, this tactic means that you need a secure cross-origin communications mechanism, again introducing complexity and additional failure modes. Alternatively, the payment vendor might offer an integration based on HTTP redirects, but this can result in a less smooth user experience.

Design choices related to nonfunctional requirements can have fairly far-reaching implications in areas of domain-specific technical expertise: we started out discussing a tradeoff related to mitigating risks associated with handling payment data, and ended up thinking about considerations that are deep in the realm of web platform security. Along the way, we also encountered contractual and regulatory concerns.

Managing Tensions and Aligning Goals

With some up-front planning, you can often satisfy important nonfunctional requirements like security and reliability without having to give up features, and at reasonable cost. When stepping back to consider security and reliability in the context of the entire system and development and operations workflow, it often becomes apparent that these goals are very much aligned with general software quality attributes.

Example: Microservices and the Google Web Application Framework

Consider the evolution of a Google-internal framework for microservices and web applications. The primary goal of the team creating the framework was to streamline the development and operation of applications and services for large organizations. In designing this framework, the team incorporated the key idea of applying static and dynamic conformance checks to ensure that application code adheres to various coding guidelines and best practices. For example, a conformance check verifies that all values passed between concurrent execution contexts are of immutable types—a practice that drastically reduces the likelihood of concurrency bugs. Another set of conformance checks enforces isolation constraints between components, which makes it much less likely that a change in one component/module of the application results in a bug in another component.

Because applications built on this framework have a fairly rigid and well-defined structure, the framework can provide out-of-the-box automation for many common development and deployment tasks—from scaffolding for new components, to automated setup of continuous integration (CI) environments, to largely automated production deployments. These benefits have made this framework quite popular among Google developers.

What does all this have to do with security and reliability? The framework development team collaborated with SRE and security teams throughout the design and implementation phases, ensuring that security and reliability best practices were woven into the fabric of the framework—not just bolted on at the end. The framework takes responsibility for handling many common security and reliability concerns. Similarly, it automatically sets up monitoring for operational metrics and incorporates reliability features like health checking and SLA compliance.

For example, the framework’s web application support handles most common types of web application vulnerabilities.7 Through a combination of API design and code conformance checks, it effectively prevents developers from accidentally introducing many common types of vulnerabilities in application code.8 With respect to these types of vulnerabilities, the framework goes beyond “security by default”—rather, it takes full responsibility for security, and actively ensures that any application based on it is not affected by these risks. We discuss how this is accomplished in more detail in Chapters 6 and 12.

Aligning Emergent-Property Requirements

The framework example illustrates that, contrary to common perception, security- and reliability-related goals are often well aligned with other product goals—especially code and project health and maintainability and long-term, sustained project velocity. In contrast, attempting to retrofit security and reliability goals as a late add-on often leads to increased risks and costs.

Priorities for security and reliability can also align with priorities in other areas:

• As discussed in Chapter 6, system design that enables people to effectively and accurately reason about invariants and behaviors of the system is crucial for security and reliability. Understandability is also a key code and project health attribute, and a key support for development velocity: an understandable system is easier to debug and to modify (without introducing bugs in the first place).

• Designing for recovery (see Chapter 9) allows us to quantify and control the risk introduced by changes and rollouts. Typically, the design principles discussed here support a higher rate of change (i.e., deployment velocity) than we could achieve otherwise.

• Security and reliability demand that we design for a changing landscape (see Chapter 7). Doing so makes our system design more adaptable and positions us not only to swiftly address newly emerging vulnerabilities and attack scenarios, but also to accommodate changing business requirements more quickly.

Initial Velocity Versus Sustained Velocity

There’s a natural tendency, especially in smaller teams, to defer security and reliability concerns until some point in the future (“We’ll add in security and worry about scaling after we have some customers”). Teams commonly justify ignoring security and reliability as early and primary design drivers for the sake of “velocity”—they’re concerned that spending time thinking about and addressing these concerns will slow development and introduce unacceptable delays into their first release cycle.

It’s important to make a distinction between initial velocity and sustained velocity. Choosing to not account for critical requirements like security, reliability, and maintainability early in the project cycle may indeed increase your project’s velocity early in the project’s lifetime. However, experience shows that doing so also usually slows you down significantly later.10 The late-stage cost of retrofitting a design to accommodate requirements that manifest as emergent properties can be very substantial. Furthermore, making invasive late-stage changes to address security and reliability risks can in itself introduce even more security and reliability risks. Therefore, it’s important to embed security and reliability in your team culture early on (for more on this topic, see Chapter 21).

The early history of the internet,11 and the design and evolution of the underlying protocols such as IP, TCP, DNS, and BGP, offers an interesting perspective on this topic. Reliability—in particular, survivability of the network even in the face of outages of nodes12 and reliability of communications despite failure-prone links13—were explicit and high-priority design goals of the early precursors of today’s internet, such as ARPANET.

Security, however, is not mentioned much in early internet papers and documentation. Early networks were essentially closed, with nodes operated by trusted research and government institutions. But in today’s open internet, this assumption does not hold at all—many types of malicious actors are participating in the network (see Chapter 2).

The internet’s foundational protocols—IP, UDP, and TCP—have no provision to authenticate the originator of transmissions, nor to detect intentional, malicious modification of data by an intermediate node in the network. Many higher-level protocols, such as HTTP or DNS, are inherently vulnerable to various attacks by malicious participants in the network. Over time, secure protocols or protocol extensions have been developed to defend against such attacks. For example, HTTPS augments HTTP by transferring data over an authenticated, secure channel. At the IP layer, IPsec cryptographically authenticates network-level peers and provides data integrity and confidentiality. IPsec can be used to establish VPNs over untrusted IP networks.

However, widely deploying these secure protocols has proven to be rather difficult. We’re now approximately 50 years into the internet’s history, and significant commercial usage of the internet began perhaps 25 or 30 years ago—yet there is still a substantial fraction of web traffic that does not use HTTPS.14

For another example of the tradeoff between initial and sustained velocity (in this case from outside the security and reliability realm), consider Agile development processes. A primary goal of Agile development workflows is to increase development and deployment velocity—in particular, to reduce the latency between feature specification and deployment. However, Agile workflows typically rely on reasonably mature unit and integration testing practices and a solid continuous integration infrastructure, which require an up-front investment to establish, in exchange for long-term benefits to velocity and stability.

More generally, you can choose to prioritize initial project velocity above all else—you can develop the first iteration of your web app without tests, and with a release process that amounts to copying tarballs to production hosts. You’ll probably get your first demo out relatively quickly, but by your third release, your project will quite possibly be behind schedule and saddled with technical debt.

We’ve already touched on alignment between reliability and velocity: investing in a mature continuous integration/continuous deployment (CI/CD) workflow and infrastructure supports frequent production releases with a managed and acceptable reliability risk (see Chapter 7). But setting up such a workflow requires some up-front investment—for example, you will need the following:

• Unit and integration test coverage robust enough to ensure an acceptably low risk of defects for production releases, without requiring major human release qualification work

• A CI/CD pipeline that is itself reliable

• A frequently exercised, reliable infrastructure for staggered production rollouts and rollbacks

• A software architecture that permits decoupled rollouts of code and configurations (e.g., “feature flags”)

This investment is typically modest when made early in a product’s lifecycle, and it requires only incremental effort by developers to maintain good test coverage and “green builds” on an ongoing basis. In contrast, a development workflow with poor test automation, reliance on manual steps in deployment, and long release cycles tends to eventually bog down a project as it grows in complexity. At that point, retrofitting test and release automation tends to require a lot of work all at once and might slow down your project even more. Furthermore, tests retrofitted to a mature system can sometimes fall into the trap of exercising the current buggy behavior more than the correct, intended behavior.

These investments are beneficial for projects of all sizes. However, larger organizations can enjoy even more benefits of scale, as you can amortize the cost across many projects—an individual project’s investment then boils down to a commitment to use centrally maintained frameworks and workflows.

When it comes to making security-focused design choices that contribute to sustained velocity, we recommend choosing a framework and workflow that provide secure-by-construction defense against relevant classes of vulnerabilities. This choice can drastically reduce, or even eliminate, the risk of introducing such vulnerabilities during ongoing development and maintenance of your application’s codebase (see Chapters 6 and 12). This commitment generally doesn’t involve significant up-front investment—rather, it entails an incremental and typically modest ongoing effort to adhere to the framework’s constraints. In return, you drastically reduce your risk of unplanned system outages or security response fire drills throwing deployment schedules into disarray. Additionally, your release-time security and production readiness reviews are much more likely to go smoothly.

Conclusion

It’s not easy to design and build secure and reliable systems, especially since security and reliability are primarily emergent properties of the entire development and operations workflow. This undertaking involves thinking about a lot of rather complex topics, many of which at first don’t seem all that related to addressing the primary feature requirements of your service.

Your design process will involve numerous tradeoffs between security, reliability, and feature requirements. In many cases, these tradeoffs will at first appear to be in direct conflict. It might seem tempting to avoid these issues in the early stages of a project and “deal with them later”—but doing so often comes at significant cost and risk to your project: once your service is live, reliability and security are not optional. If your service is down, you may lose business; and if your service is compromised, responding will require all hands on deck. But with good planning and careful design, it is often possible to satisfy all three of these aspects. What’s more, you can do so with modest additional up-front cost, and often with a reduced total engineering effort over the lifetime of the system.

1 For a more formal treatment, see The MITRE Systems Engineering Guide and ISO/IEC/IEEE 29148-2018(E).

2 For the purposes of the example, it’s not relevant what exactly is being sold—a media outlet might require payments for articles, a mobility company might require payments for transportation, an online marketplace might enable the purchase of physical goods that are shipped to consumers, or a food-ordering service might facilitate the delivery of takeout orders from local restaurants.

3 See, for example, McCallister, Erika, Tim Grance, and Karen Scarfone. 2010. NIST Special Publication 800-122, “Guide to Protecting the Confidentiality of Personally Identifiable Information (PII).” https://oreil.ly/T9G4D.

4 Note that whether or not this is appropriate may depend on regulatory frameworks your organization is subject to; these regulatory matters are outside the scope of this book.

5 See, e.g., the Sandboxed API project.

6 For more on this subject, see Zalewski, Michał. 2011. The Tangled Web: A Guide to Securing Modern Web Applications. San Francisco, CA: No Starch Press.

7 See, e.g., the OWASP Top 10 and CWE/SANS TOP 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors.

8 See Kern, Christoph. 2014. “Securing the Tangled Web.” Communications of the ACM 57(9): 38–47. doi:10.1145/2643134.

9 At Google, software is typically built from the HEAD of a common repository, which causes all dependencies to be updated automatically with every build. See Potvin, Rachel, and Josh Levenberg. 2016. “Why Google Stores Billions of Lines of Code in a Single Repository.” Communications of the ACM 59(7): 78–87. https://oreil.ly/jXTZM.

10 See the discussion of tactical programming versus strategic programming in Ousterhout, John. 2018. A Philosophy of Software Design. Palo Alto, CA: Yaknyam Press. Martin Fowler makes similar observations.

11 See RFC 2235 and Leiner, Barry M. et al. 2009. “A Brief History of the Internet.” ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review 39(5): 22–31. doi:10.1145/1629607.1629613.

12 Baran, Paul. 1964. “On Distributed Communications Networks.” IEEE Transactions on Communications Systems 12(1): 1–9. doi:10.1109/TCOM.1964.1088883.

13 Roberts, Lawrence G., and Barry D. Wessler. 1970. “Computer Network Development to Achieve Resource Sharing.” Proceedings of the 1970 Spring Joint Computing Conference: 543–549. doi:10.1145/1476936.1477020.

14 Felt, Adrienne Porter, Richard Barnes, April King, Chris Palmer, Chris Bentzel, and Parisa Tabriz. 2017. “Measuring HTTPS Adoption on the Web.” Proceedings of the 26th USENIX Conference on Security Symposium: 1323–1338. https://oreil.ly/G1A9q.

What are trade

What trade

What are the major challenges in designing service products?

Who needs to involved in the design of products and services?